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James Tilley, University of Oxford
Anja Neundorf, University of Nottingham
Sara B. Hobolt, London School of Economics and Political ScienceIn this article we revisit the often disregarded pocketbook voting thesis that suggests that people evaluate governments
based on the state of their own finances. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey over the last 20 years, we
measure changes in personal financial circumstances and show that the pocketbook voting model works. Crucially, we
also argue that the ability to attribute responsibility for these changes to the government matters. People respond much
more strongly to changes in their own finances that are linked to government spending, such as welfare transfers, than to
similar changes that are less clearly the responsibility of elected officials, such as lower personal earnings. We conclude that
pocketbook voting is a real phenomenon, but that more attention should be paid to how people assign credit and blame for
changes in their own economic circumstances.In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, citizens need only calculate the changes in their own welfare.
—Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (1981, 5)o voters’ assessments of their changing financial cir-
cumstances shape their party support? The above quo-
tation suggests that retrospective economic voting is
fairly straightforward. If people think that they are personally
worse off, then they should “throw the rascals out,” but if they
feel better off they should reelect the incumbent. This is re-
ferred to as pocketbook voting, where voters choose to pun-
ish or reward governments on the basis of changes in their
personal economic circumstances. While the idea of pocket-
book voting continues to dominate political discourse, there
is surprisingly little empirical evidence to support it and the
possible reasons that underlie this type of voting remain opaque.
The consensus in the economic voting literature has long been
that while voters do base their party support on retrospective
economic evaluations, it is primarily their assessment of the
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Yet recent work has suggested that changes in individual
financial circumstances can affect voting behavior in certain
contexts. This evidence, based mainly on quasi-experimental
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ernment policies that affect their livelihoods and bank ac-
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we contribute to the study of economic voting by not only
presenting an empirical reassessment of the pocketbook vot-
ing thesis using panel survey data but also examining the un-
derlying mechanisms of such voting. We argue that pocket-
book voting is linked to how citizens attribute responsibility
for changes in their personal economic circumstances. Instead
of assuming that voters hold the government equally respon-
sible for all changes to their financial situation, we argue that
changes that can be directly linked to government policies have
a greater effect on support for the incumbent.
To rigorously test these propositions, we analyze data from
the British Household Panel Survey. These data are particu-
larly well suited to test the pocketbook voting and attribution
theses. By using repeated observations of the same people over
a long time span that includes different incumbent govern-
ments, we aim to minimize difficulties associated with causal
inference and endogeneity: the problem of whether vote choices
cause economic perceptions rather than vice versa (Evans and
Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010; Fraile and Lewis-Beck
2014; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008; Tilley, Garry, and
Bold 2008). Our analysis demonstrates that voters’ evaluations
of changes in their personal finances do shift party support.
When people think that they are personally worse off, they
are less likely to support the governing party, and when they
are personally better off, they are more likely to support the
governing party. These results hold under a number of dif-
ferent model specifications, including cross-lagged models of
perceptions and party support. Crucially, we also show that
these effects depend on why people think their material con-
ditions have changed. Changes that might be difficult to at-
tribute to the government have a weaker effect than those that
are easier to pin on the government. In particular, government
welfare transfers increasing or decreasing make a substantial
difference to party choice, whereas changes to earnings are
much less consequential. These findings have important im-
plications for economic voting and, more broadly, for our un-
derstanding of how voters hold governments to account. We
suggest that voters take notice of government policies that af-
fect them directly and sanction incumbents accordingly.
POCKETBOOK VOTING AND ATTRIBUTION
OF RESPONSIBILITY
The early economic voting literature focused on macro-economic
change and how good economic performance strengthened sup-
port for incumbent parties. Most studies used aggregate data,
including a variety of different ways of measuring “good” eco-
nomic performance including high growth, low unemploy-
ment, or low inflation (see Kramer 1971; Mueller 1970; TufteThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms 1978). However, because of the country-level nature of these
studies, it was difficult to disentangle the individual level reward-
punishment mechanism of the model. In recent decades, most
people have therefore used survey data with people’s views of
economic change as an indicator of macro-economic perfor-
mance (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier [2000, 2007] for over-
views). A key question in this literature is whether economic
voting is driven by personal experiences. Are voters motivated
to change their party preferences by changes to their pocket-
book? Despite the widespread assumption that voters eval-
uate incumbents, at least in part, on the basis of how govern-
ment policies have affected their personal economic fortunes,
it is not clear that pocketbook considerations matter. While
some studies do find evidence of pocketbook voting (Alvarez
and Saving 1997; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006; Nannestad
and Paldam 1994, 1997), most find zero or modest effects
(Feldman 1982; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000; Soss and Schram 2007). In their excellent re-
views of a large number of published studies on economic vot-
ing, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007, 2013) conclude that the
empirical support for the pocketbook voting model is marginal
at best.
This conclusion is surprising. While it is very persuasive
that sociotropic evaluations are a crucial factor shaping vote
choice, there are equally compelling reasons why pocketbook
considerations might also matter. Much of the theoretical lit-
erature on strategic politicians assumes that incumbents can
bolster their reelection chances by securing additional resources
for their constituents and targeting public spending (Dixit
and Londegan 1996; Tufte 1978). There is also plenty of evi-
dence to suggest that politicians use public budgets to try and
keep constituents happy (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Lindbeck
andWeibull 1987; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle andWeingast 1981),
implying that politicians certainly believe that citizens vote
with their pocketbooks (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). This
model of strategic politicians using public spending towin votes
rests on the assumption that voters also behave in a self-
interested manner: voters reward incumbent politicians when
they benefit from public transfers and punish them when
public spending cuts affect them. In other words, vote choices
are shaped not just by perceptions of the national economy but
also by people’s perceptions of their own personal economic
situation.
Some studies have shown effects of pocketbook consider-
ations in the very specific case of US Congressional elections
(Alvarez and Saving 1997; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006; Levitt
and Snyder 1997). Another strand of more recent research has
also identified substantial effects of specific changes in policy
on the behavior and attitudes of those people affected. Rather116.071 on November 22, 2019 06:04:23 AM
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personal financial circumstances, most of this work uses quasi-
experimental designs to investigate how actual policy change
has influenced party preferences. Examples of where such pol-
icy effects have been found include the Vietnam Draft Lottery
in the United States (Erikson and Stoker 2011), flood responses
in Germany (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011), investment in
urban public transport in Spain (de la Calle and Orriols 2010),
non-payment of wages in Russia (Richter 2006), targeted gov-
ernment spending to poor families in Romania (Pop-Eleches
and Pop-Eleches 2012), conditional cash transfers in Brazil
(Zucco 2013), and budget cuts affecting parents with young
children in Sweden (Elinder et al. 2015).
Taken together, this more recent work suggests that vot-
ers respond in a self-interested manner to specific policy
changes that affect their financial circumstances, and this calls
for a more general reexamination of the pocketbook voting
model. The aim of this article is thus to return to this model
by examining whether perceptions of change in personal fi-
nancial circumstances shape support for the incumbent, using
high quality panel survey data in a more typical party-based
parliamentary system. We focus on perceptions, as pocket-
book voting is about people’s subjective views of improve-
ment (or deterioration) to their personal finances and the
impact of those perceptions on vote choice. Specifically, we
hypothesize that if people think that their own financial con-
ditions have improved, they will reward the incumbent gov-
erning party. In contrast, when people think that their own
finances have deteriorated, they will be more likely to support
the opposition. This leads to a restatement of the pocketbook
voting hypothesis as follows:
H1. People who think that their personal finances
have improved are more likely to support the incum-
bent party than people who think their personal financial
situation has deteriorated.
We go one step further than simply testing the classic pock-
etbook voting thesis to also examine the mechanisms that
lead voters to punish or reward governments for changes in
their personal economic circumstances. Importantly, we do not
argue that all changes in personal finances are a useful heu-
ristic for ascertaining how well the incumbent has performed,
as Fiorina (1981) suggests in the opening quotation of this
article. Rather, we amend the basic model of pocketbook vot-
ing in one crucial way: we take into account the reason why
people think their finances have changed.We argue that changes
that are within the government’s remit will be more important
in deciding vote choices. It is less a case of macro-economicThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms change driving party preferences via personal finances, but
rather government policies shaping those party preferences via
personal finances. The intermediary in both cases is the vot-
er’s personal financial situation, but the way in which govern-
ments shape those situations is quite different.
We argue that attribution of responsibility is thus a mod-
erator of pocketbook voting. The importance of responsibility
is already well established in studies of sociotropic economic
voting. In their seminal article, Powell and Whitten (1993)
show that economic voting is conditioned by the “clarity of
responsibility” of political institutions. More specifically, they
argue that complex institutional and governmental structures
blur lines of responsibility, and this blurring makes it more
difficult for voters to assign responsibility and therefore sanc-
tion governments on the basis of their performance. In sub-
sequent work, scholars have extended the original Powell and
Whitten index and have moved toward a more dynamic un-
derstanding of how clarity of responsibility matters (Anderson
2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci
2013; Nadeau, Niemi, andYoshinaka 2002;Whitten and Palmer
1999). The basic finding remains the same: if voters cannot
say that the government is responsible for the outcome, they
also cannot punish it for poor outcomes. However, while it is
well established that attribution of responsibility is a key fac-
tor in sociotropic economic voting, this has been largely over-
looked when it comes to people’s personal finances.
Existing studies of pocketbook voting often rely on the
(usually tacit) assumption that voters attribute all changes in
their financial situation to the policies of the government (Kin-
der and Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck
2001). Equally for work that shows that voters adjust politi-
cal preferences in response to specific policy events, such as
disaster relief or a military draft, attribution of causal respon-
sibility is fairly straightforward. Attributing responsibility for
changes in household incomes is far from straightforward,
however. Incumbent governments have little control over peo-
ple’s day-to-day finances, and citizens are likely to be aware
of this (Gomez and Wilson 2001; Hellwig 2001; Hobolt and
Tilley 2014; Marsh and Tilley 2010; Rudolph 2003; Tilley and
Hobolt 2011). Moreover, there are differences in the causes of
changing personal incomes that will lead individuals to assign
more or less responsibility to the government. Put simply, some
changes are more directly linked to government policies than
others. This seems to be most likely the case when it comes to
increases or decreases in welfare transfers. After all, these are
payments from government agencies to individuals. We there-
fore hypothesize that voters will be more likely to support the
government if they receive an increase in government trans-
fers than if they earn more money because of a new job or116.071 on November 22, 2019 06:04:23 AM
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increased spending power to actions of the government. In
the latter situation, voters will, no doubt, see this as a result of
their own hard work, ability, or good fortune. Our second hy-
pothesis is thus:
H2. The effect of changing personal finances on in-
cumbent party support is greater when the causes of
these changes can be more directly attributed to changes
in government spending.3. For the 1991–96 period when the Conservatives were in government,
Labour supporters make up 38% of the panel, and this is only slightly lower at
35% during the 1997–2008 period when Labour is in power.
4. This represents a slightly reduced categorization from the original
coding by the BHPS (the verbatim answers are not available). The mainMETHODS AND DATA
To test these hypotheses, we use the unique and underex-
plored British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This survey
ran from 1991 until 2008 and therefore encompasses a pe-
riod of Conservative government (1991–97) and a period of
Labour government (1997–2008).1 The BHPS is an annual face-
to-face panel survey of a representative sample of the Brit-
ish population with a questionnaire that is mainly focused
on changes in household composition, labor market partici-
pation, and other economic and sociological factors. Our de-
pendent variable is party support. This is measured using three
questions. The first asks whether respondents think of them-
selves as a “supporter of any one political party.” If they say
no, then they are asked whether they think of themselves as
“a little closer to one political party than to the others.” And
if they say no to that, they are finally asked “if there were to
be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you
think you would be most likely to support.”2 In essence, this
is a measure of vote in years when there are no elections. It
is widely used to measure vote intention in the British case
(Evans and Tilley 2012; Tilley 2015) and is highly correlated
with vote choice in election years. For example, in 1997 we
have people’s recalled vote in May and our measure of party
support in the autumn. Ninety-two percent of people that
voted Conservative in May 1997 said that they supported the
Conservatives a few months later, the same comparison for
Labour is 91%, and the Liberal Democrats 86%. Given that the
British electoral system generates some tactical voting, with
slightly under 10% of people voting tactically over the 1990s and1. After the 2008 wave the BHPS was discontinued, although many of
the participants formed part of a new “Understanding Society” longitudinal
survey. For more information on the BHPS (including the exact sampling
strategy and level of panel attrition) see https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps.
2. For the 1992 wave, people were not asked a vote intention but rather
how they voted in the 1992 election. For people that did not answer the
“supporter” and “closer” questions we used vote choice in 1992 to calculate
party support.
This content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms 2000s (Fisher 2004; Fisher and Curtice 2006), this suggests that
our measure of party support is essentially a measure of vote
intention free of these tactical concerns.
In our analysis, we exclude Northern Ireland, which has a
very different party system, as well as any respondents under
18 who are not eligible to vote in general elections. This leaves
us with a sample of 9,354 people during the Conservative
government (1991–96 waves) and 17,183 respondents dur-
ing the Labour government (1997–2008 waves). About 40% of
the people in the repeated sample are “supporters” of a party,
another 22% are closer to a party and a further 15% give a
vote intention. Of our total repeated sample between 1991 and
2008, 23% are Conservatives, 36% Labour, 12% Liberal Dem-
ocrats, 7% support other smaller parties, and 23% do not sup-
port a party. This distribution only changes slightly over time.3
Our two main independent variables are measures of
changing personal financial circumstances. The first of these
is a widely used question about perceptions of change over
the last year (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007). It
is thus analogous to the standard sociotropic measure that
asks about perceptions of how the general economic situation
changed over the last year. As discussed earlier, by measuring
perceptions of change we are measuring the most proximate
factor to party choice. The exact wording of the perceptions
question is: “Would you say that you yourself are better off or
worse off financially than you were a year ago? Better off, worse
off, about the same.” Forty-eight percent of our total repeated
sample reports no change in income, 27% an increase, and 24% a
decrease.
Crucially, for anyone that said that they were better or
worse off, this is followed by an open-ended question that
asks simply “why is that?” The responses to this have been
coded into eight categories: increased earnings, increased
government transfers, reduced expenses, other increases in
income, decreased earnings, decreased government transfers,
increased expenses, other decreases in income.4 We divide itchanges are twofold. First, we roll some of the smaller categories (investment
income changes, one-off windfalls or expenditure, and “good management”)
into the “other” increases or decreases in income. Second, some people men-
tioned both positive and negative changes to their financial situation. For
example, some people said that they were earning more, but they also faced
more expenses. We have coded these people (less than 2% of people that
said their financial circumstances had changed) by the dominant change, so
the person who is earning more but faces more expenditure and said that
they were better off overall is counted as someone who has had a change due
to increased earnings.
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government transfer income. It is worth noting that in the
United Kingdom, as in most other European welfare states,
government cash payments are not simply targeted at the
poor. A substantial proportion of the population receives some
form of transfer from the government. For example, almost
every family with children receives child benefit; for a family
with two children this is almost £2,000 a year, and almost
everyone over the age of 65 receives a state pension of at least
£6,000 a year. On average, between 1991 and 2008, 56% of
BHPS households received some form of cash benefit paid
directly by the state.5. The models were estimated using the LatentGOLD 5.1 software
(Vermunt and Magidson 2013).
6. For this to be effective, we need people to be in multiple waves of the
data. This means that we have excluded respondents that only answered
questions in one or two waves. A minimum of three responses gives us at
least two transitions per person. For the 1991–97 period, this excludes about
10% of respondents and for the 1998–2008 period about 5% of respondents.MODELING POCKETBOOK VOTING
Our goal is to test whether a respondent’s own financial ex-
periences inform their party choice. For that, we rely on the
structure of our data. The BHPS is a panel survey and in-
terviews the same people year after year. We are thus able to
model the dynamics of party support given changes in per-
sonal finances. There are three parts to this. First, we need to
account for serial correlation, as people’s successive measures
of party support are dependent on their previous party sup-
port. Second, we need to include changes in someone’s fi-
nancial situation in predicting party support. Finally, we need
to take into account that when people enter the panel they
differ in how likely they are to support a particular party (this
relates to unit heterogeneity). We meet these three require-
ments by using a first-order Markov transitioning structure,
where someone’s party preference at time t is a function of
their party preference at time t 2 1. Two recent articles by
Clarke and McCutcheon (2009) and Neundorf, Stegmueller,
and Scotto (2011) demonstrate that Markov models are par-
ticularly good at specifying the dynamics of individual-level
party support. As we have only a few waves of data and a
categorical dependent variable, Markov models are prefer-
able to a fixed effects (FE) model. The problem of modeling
a categorical dependent variable (party support) with a FE model
is that “the FE estimator shows a large positive finite sample
bias in discrete choice models when t is very small” (Greene
2004, 144). Equally, “dynamic models of preferences should
include a persistence parameter capturing this correlation”
(Stegmueller 2013, 316). FE logistic models cannot account
for this state dependence in the data, as standard FE estimation
strategies are unavailable due to the presence of a lagged de-
pendent (endogenous) variable in the nonlinear model (Arel-
lano and Carrasco 2003; Heckman 1981; Nickell 1981). We
nonetheless present the results of fixed effect models in ta-
ble 5 of the robustness section, and the results are consistent
with our findings.This content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms In terms of specification, if i indexes individuals (ip 1, . . . ,
I ) observed in BHPS survey wave t(t 2 1; :::;T), then a
Markov model is specified as5
log

P(PSit p rjPSit p s)
PSit p sjPSit p s

p b0rs 1 b1rstPSi;t21 ð1Þ
Model 1 specifies the categorical level variable measuring
party support PSt, to be a function of the previously held party
loyalty PSt21. The model’s transition dynamics are parame-
trized by a series of logit equations modeling the probability
of supporting party r instead of party s as a function of the
overall intercepts and the lagged party support effects that
are captured by b1rst. The advantage of this model over other
techniques is the use of a categorical dependent variable. The
model’s transition dynamics are parametrized by a time-
heterogeneousMarkov transition structure, allowing transition
probabilities in and out of party support to differ between sur-
veys. This captures overall time effects such as the changing
nature of party fortunes due to leadership changes, political
scandals, and so forth.
Once we have determined the dynamics of individuals’
party support we can introduce the covariate xit that measures
changes in a respondent’s personal finances. Model 2 intro-
duces the coefficients b2rs that measure the impact of people’s
subjective finances on the probability of someone updating
their support for any of the parties at time t:6
log

P(PSit p rjPSit p s)
PSit p sjPSit p s

p b0rs 1 b1rstPSi;t21 1 b2rsxit
ð2Þ
The model above models the dynamics of party support and
how changes in a respondent’s finances affect this dynamic.
People clearly differ in their probability to support one or
another party (or none at all) in the first place. It is therefore
important to account for variables that predict party support,
and model 3 controls for a range of social characteristics (K)
at the point at which people first entered the panel (t p 0):
log

P(PSi0 p rjPSi0 p s)
PSi0 p sjPSi0 p s

p a0rs 1 o
K
kp1
akwi0k ð3Þ
These variables are well-known demographic predictors of
party support in the British context: occupational social class,116.071 on November 22, 2019 06:04:23 AM
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ment, education, housing tenure, and gender.7
RESULTS
Do changes in people’s household finances affect their sup-
port for governing and opposition parties? To answer this
question we divide the panel into two periods: the 1991–96
period when the Conservatives are in government and La-
bour, along with all other parties, are in opposition; and the
1997–2008 period during which Labour is in government and
the Conservatives, and all other parties, are in opposition.8
Table 1 reports the main effects of personal finances on
the transition probabilities of changing party support over
these two periods expressed in model 2. Specifically we show
the coefficients predicting the transition probability of some-
one updating their party support between time t 2 1 and t,
depending on whether their subjective financial situation
got better, got worse, or stayed the same. We use effect coding
rather than dummy coding, which allows us to compare the7. The coefficients for these control variables are reported in app. 2. The
impact of the control variables is much as we would expect. Older, richer
people in private sector middle-class occupations who own their own house
are more likely to support the Conservatives and the opposite for Labour
supporters. The inclusion of these variables makes little difference to the key
results concerning economic perceptions.
8. As the BHPS fieldwork is carried out in the autumn and the 1997
general election was held on May 1st, we use the 1997 data to provide a start-
ing point for people in the second period.
This content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms effect of all three options rather than using one as a refer-
ence category. Table 1 thus shows how likely it is that some-
one will switch toward, or away from, each of the parties given
their reports of how their finances have changed over the last
year. A positive number means that people switch toward that
party, a negative number that they switch away. Turning to the
Conservative government period first in table 1, what we see is
that the pound in people’s pocket does matter. Positive changes
in household finances lead to positive switches toward the
incumbent governing party, and switches away from the main
opposition party Labour. Negative changes to household fi-
nances lead to people switching away from the Conservatives
and toward Labour. There is a similar pattern for the period of
Labour government. When people feel better off, they switch
away from the Conservatives and toward Labour; when people
feel worse off, they switch toward the Conservatives and away
from the Labour government. No matter the color of the gov-
ernment, when individuals’ household finances improve, they
reward the governing party and punish the opposition; and
when their household finances deteriorate, they punish the
governing party and reward the opposition. These findings
provide support for our first hypothesis.
These are important results, as they clearly show that in-
dividuals’ party choices are affected by their changing per-
sonal financial circumstances. These effects hold for govern-
ment and opposition parties and are apparent during periods
of different party rule. To illustrate the magnitude of these
pocketbook considerations, table 2 shows how the predictedTable 1. Predicting Transition Probabilities of Party Support at t by Financial ChangeConservative11
anLabour6.071 on November 2
d Conditions (http://wLiberal2, 2019 06:04:23 AM
ww.journals.uchicagoNoneCoef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef..edu/t-and-c)SEConservative government (1991–96):
Worse off 2.11* .02 .04* .02 .04 .02 .00 .02
Stayed the same .05* .02 .01 .02 2.02 .02 .05* .02
Better off .05* .02 2.05* .02 2.02 .03 2.04* .02Labour government (1997–2008):
Worse off .05* .01 2.07* .01 .00 .02 2.02* .01
Stayed the same .00 .01 .05* .01 2.01 .01 .01 .01
Better off 2.04* .01 .02 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01Source: BHPS 1991–2008.
Note. Dependent variable: party support at t. The results are based on a Markov-chain model predicting the transition probability to
change party support from one panel wave to the next. Additionally to the coefficients reported here, the model estimated coefficients
b1rst, which capture the effects of being a supporter of a party r at t2 1 on the probability of remaining loyal to that party or switching to
party s. These coefficients are allowed to vary over time and are available upon request from the authors. Control variables measuring
age-group, housing tenure, region, education, income, occupational social class, and sector of work are included in the models at the
first time point but are not shown here (see app. 2). Other minor parties are included in the models but are not shown here (see app. 3).
Number of respondents: 1991–96, 9,354; 1997–2008, 17,183.
* p ! .05..
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 561probabilities of support for the Conservatives and Labour
parties would change for people with different party choices
and facing different financial circumstances. For the period
of Conservative party rule, individuals who previously sup-
ported the Conservatives are more likely to defect if they see
their household finances deteriorating than people who see
things improving: 80% of the former group remain loyal to
the Conservatives, compared to 83% of the latter group who
felt better off. Equally, people who supported other parties are
more likely to start supporting the Conservatives if they think
things are getting better compared to those who think things
are getting worse. For example, in any year during Conser-
vative incumbency, 13% of people with no party support in
the previous wave with a worsening financial situation became
Conservative supporters compared to 15% of people with an
improved financial situation who previously did not support
a party. The opposite pattern holds under the Labour govern-
ments. Previous Conservative supporters are more likely to
stick with the party when they think things are getting worse,
and similarly the Conservatives are more likely to pick up
supporters who think their financial situation has worsened.
The right panel of table 2 tells the same story for Labour sup-
port. Labour supporters weremore loyal, and people weremoreThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms likely to switch to Labour when their finances got worse under
the Conservatives or got better under Labour.
At first glance, these effects may appear small. The dif-
ferences between people who felt worse and better off are
a few percentage points at most. But this is not surprising.
Aggregate party support changes little from year to year, just
as most people do not change their party support from one
year to another. Appendix 1 (apps. 1–8 available online)
shows the high stability of party support. Any differences due
to changing financial circumstances appear small when mea-
sured from one year to the next because very few people,
around 20%, switch party from one year to the next. What
matters is how those small differences mount up and how
they potentially explain changes in the electoral strength of
parties. Given how few people switch, pocketbook consider-
ations are clearly a nontrivial predictor of movements between
parties.
Hence, contrary to much of the extant literature, our find-
ings lend some support to the pocketbook voting thesis: peo-
ple do change their party preferences based on their own fi-
nancial circumstances. The question remains of themechanism
that leads voters to switch parties due to changes in personal
finances. Our argument is that attribution of responsibility isTable 2. Predicted Proportion of People Supporting the Conservatives and Labour Given Their Previous Financial Circumstances
and Previous Party SupportFinancial ChangeConservative Support (at t)116.071 on November 22,
and Conditions (http://wwLabour Support (at t)Worse Off Better Off D Worse Off 2019 06:04:23 AM
w.journals.uchicago.eBetter Offdu/t-and-c).DConservative government (1991–96):
Conservative 80.0% 83.3% 23.3% 4.6% 3.7% .9%[79.4; 80.6] [82.7; 83.9] [4.3; 4.8] [3.5; 3.9]
Labour 1.8% 2.2% 2.4% 87.6% 86.5% 1.1%[1.6; 1.9] [2.0; 2.3] [87.2; 88.0] [86.0; 87.0]
Liberal 6.3% 7.1% 2.8% 15.7% 15.4% .3%[5.8; 6.6] [6.6; 7.6] [15.0; 16.4] [14.7; 17.2]
None 12.5% 14.5% 22.0% 17.8% 16.6% 1.1%[11.8; 13.0] [13.8; 15.1] [17.1; 18.5] [15.9; 17.4]
Labour government (1997–2008):Conservative 83.9% 82.0% 1.9% 2.9% 3.5% 2.6%
[83.3; 84.4] [81.4; 82.6] [2.7; 3.1] [3.3; 3.7]Labour 2.8% 2.6% .3% 78.3% 79.2% 2.9%
[2.7; 3.0] [2.4; 2.7] [77.8; 78.8] [78.8; 79.6]Liberal 6.5% 6.0% .5% 9.1% 9.7% 2.6%
[6.1; 6.9] [5.6; 6.4] [8.6; 9.6] [9.2; 10.2]None 9.6% 8.6% .9% 11.9% 12.7% 2.8%
[9.2; 10.0] [8.3; 9.0] [11.4; 12.3] [12.3; 13.1]Note. Party support at t 2 1. The estimates are based on the results presented in table 1. Statistically significant differences at the 5% level are highlighted in
bold. The 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.
562 / When the Pound in People’s Pocket Matters James Tilley, Anja Neundorf, and Sara B. Hobolta crucial part of the sanctioning process. Voters distinguish
between changes that are outside the government’s control and
changes that the government could plausibly be responsible
for, and primarily switch party support on the basis of the lat-
ter (hypothesis 2). We test this proposition by examining the
reasons that people give for the improvement or worsening of
their finances. Table 3 shows a similar model to the ones pre-
viously discussed except we break down changing financial
circumstances by the reasons that people gave for that change.
Again the coefficients here represent the effects of different
kinds of financial changes on the predicted probability of
someone updating their party support.
We observe the same patterns in terms of broadly neg-
ative coefficients associated with the governing party when
people thought things had gotten worse and positive co-
efficients when people thought things had gotten better. In
line with our expectations there is also clear variation in the
size of those coefficients dependent on why people thoughtThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms things had gotten worse or better. During the period of Con-
servative rule in the 1990s the biggest negative effect by far
on Conservative support is for people who thought that their
finances worsened due to decreased welfare payments, and the
biggest positive effect is for people who thought that their
finances improved due to increased welfare payments. Other
changes also mattered; earning more or less money affected
people’s support for the Conservatives as well, but it is benefit
changes that matter the most.
There is a similar story for the Labour period of govern-
ment. Labour gets more support from people whose govern-
ment transfers increased and less support from those with
reduced payments. The former is by far the biggest positive
effect on Labour support, and the latter is the second biggest
negative effect. These results strongly suggest that pocket-
book voting is linked to attribution of government responsi-
bility. Changes in earnings and expenses are, for most peo-
ple, far removed from government activities, whereas welfareTable 3. Predicting Transition Probabilities of Party Support at t by Reasons for Financial ChangeConservative Labour116.071 on November 22, 
and Conditions (http://wwwLiberal2019 06:04:23 AM
.journals.uchicago.edu/t-andNoneCoef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef.-c).SEConservative government (1991–96):
Increased earnings .11* .05 2.06 .04 2.14* .05 .03 .04
Increased benefits .23* .12 .06 .11 .06 .12 2.16 .12
Reduced expenses .02 .09 2.04 .08 .04 .09 .05 .08
Other increase .18* .07 2.16* .07 2.20* .08 2.01 .07
Same/No change .09* .03 .00 .03 2.06 .03 .09* .03
Decreased earnings 2.18* .06 .01 .05 2.02 .06 .09 .05
Decreased benefits 2.37* .15 .12 .12 .23 .14 2.19 .13
More expenses 2.08 .05 .09* .04 .04 .05 .08 .05
Other decrease 2.01 .07 2.02 .06 .07 .07 .02 .06Labour government (1997–2008):
Increased earnings 2.06* .03 2.01 .02 .03 .03 .07* .02
Increased benefits .06 .06 .35* .05 .01 .06 2.22* .05
Reduced expenses 2.05 .05 .00 .04 .07 .05 .04 .03
Other increase .03 .04 2.03 .03 .03 .04 2.03 .03
Same/No change .00 .02 .06* .02 .01 .02 .01 .01
Decreased earnings 2.01 .04 2.02 .03 .02 .04 .04 .03
Decreased benefits 2.16 .11 2.13 .08 2.23* .11 .22* .07
More expenses .06* .03 2.05* .02 .04 .03 2.08* .02
Other decrease .14* .04 2.15* .04 .02 .05 2.05 .03Source: BHPS 1991–2008.
Note. Dependent variable: party support at t. The results are based on a Markov-Chain model predicting the transition probability to change party support
from one panel wave to the next. Additionally to the coefficients reported here, the model estimated coefficients b1rst, which capture the effects of being
a supporter of a party r at t 2 1 on the probability of remaining loyal to that party or switching to party s. These coefficients are allowed to vary over time and
are available upon request from the authors. Control variables measuring age-group, housing tenure, region, education, income, occupational social class, and
sector of work are included in the models at the first time point but are not shown here (see app. 2). Other minor parties are included in the models but are not
shown here (see app. 3). Number of respondents: 1991–96, 9,354; 1997–2008, 17,183.
* p ! .05.
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 563transfers are paid by the government. Compare the myriad
reasons why you might earn more money this year than last
year with the reality of receiving more or less money paid
directly into your bank account by a government agency.
The latter is something that can be very easily blamed on, or
credited to, the governing party. There are other differences
by people’s cited reason for change that we could give post
hoc explanations for. Changes in earnings seem to matter
for the Conservatives when they are in government during
an economic recession but not for Labour when they are in
government during an economic boom. But disentangling
whether this is due to the party in charge, or the economic
conditions of the day, is not possible. Indeed, the variation in
how different changes matter only highlights the much larger
and more consistent effect of government transfer changes
compared to everything else.
Figure 1 shows our predictions of how benefit changes
affect government support for people who already support
the governing party. In effect, this is the degree of loyalty that
people have to the governing party if they already support it.
For the 1991–96 period, we would predict that 73% of peo-
ple that supported the Conservatives last year and saw their
transfers decrease would support the Conservatives this year.
For similar people who saw their transfers increase over 84%
would support the Conservatives. Exactly the same pattern
can be seen for Labour after 1997. People are substantially moreThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms loyal to governing parties, regardless of their ideological stance,
if they think that they are better off due to higher transfers
than if they think they are worse off due to lower transfers.
Equally, defection rates to governing parties are much
greater when people see their welfare benefits increase than
when they see their welfare benefits decrease. Figure 2 shows
how these defection rates vary. Defecting to the incumbent
party is of course dependent on previous party support and
general changes toward the governing party. There are few
direct movements between Labour and the Conservatives for
either period but quite substantial amounts of defection to
the governing party from people who supported no party
and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats. More impor-
tantly we see the large differences between people who said
their transfers increased compared to those whose transfers
decreased. Fewer people moved to the governing party (whether
Labour or Conservative) if they were worse off due to changes
to their transfers than did people who were better off. Overall,
the rates of defection to incumbent parties for gainers from
government transfer changes are almost double those for los-
ers of transfer changes.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the question of whether
the inclusion of changes in perceptions of personal finances
produces a better-fitting model of party support change. Ta-
ble 4 reports the log-likelihood ratio test for model 1 (per-
sonal financial change included as in table 1) and model 2Figure 1. Predicted proportion of people staying loyal to the governing party given their changing benefit levels. Predicted probabilities calculated from table 3.
Bars show 95% confidence intervals.116.071 on November 22, 2019 06:04:23 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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(which only includes lagged party support and control var-
iables at t p 0), and the answer to that question is yes.
Including changes in financial circumstances, as well as the
more nuanced measure of reasons for those changes, signifi-
cantly improves model fit.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section, we test the robustness of our main findings to
address possible concerns about (a) the endogeneity and causal
structure, (b) the use of alternative estimation techniques,
(c) the inclusion of macro-economic evaluations, (d) the con-
ditional effects of political interest, (e) the operationalizationThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms of the dependent variable, and ( f ) the use of party support
rather than vote.
Endogeneity and causal structure
One obvious issue with our results is the possible endo-
geneity of personal finance evaluations, which might them-
selves be driven by party support. We have attempted to test
for this possibility by estimating cross-lagged models, in
which we simultaneously model the dynamics of party sup-
port and subjective financial evaluations (Dancey and Goren
2010; Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010;
Milazzo, Adams, and Green 2012). The results are reported
in appendix 4. Cross-lagged models estimate the effect ofFigure 2. Predicted proportion of people defecting to the governing party given their changing benefit levels and previous party support. Predicted prob-
abilities calculated from table 3. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.Table 4. Model FitLog Likelihood116.071 on November 2
and Conditions (http://wLog Ratio2, 2019 06:04:23 AM
ww.journals.uchicagdfo.edu/t-and-cSig.Conservative government (1991–96):
M0: Only control variables at t p 0 241,078
M1: Incl. financial change (table 1) 241,060 36 8 .001
M2: Incl. reasons for financial change (table 2) 241,037 82 16 .001Labour government (1997–2008):
M0: Only control variables at t p 0 2124,851
M1: Incl. financial change (table 1) 2124,824 54 8 .001
M2: Incl. reasons for financial change (table 2) 2124,755 192 16 .001).
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 565previous party support on reported financial change and vice
versa. In summary, we find that personal financial evaluations
are partly a product of previous party support: individuals
who support the opposition party are more likely to feel that
they are worse off. Overall, the cross-lagged effects of party
support on personal financial situations are relatively small
however, and the effects of lagged personal finances on party
support remain largely consistent. Accounting as best we can for
possible endogeneity, the pocketbook voting hypothesis appears
to hold.Estimation
As outlined in the earlier discussion, using fixed effect mod-
els is not ideal since we have a categorical dependent vari-
able and data with many cases, but few waves. Nonetheless,
we also ran standard fixed effects models that predict sup-
port for the incumbent party versus any other party, or no
party, for our two government periods. These models are
shown in table 5. Despite using a more conservative esti-
mation procedure, the results confirm the general pocketbook
voting hypothesis. Changes in benefits also push people toward
or away from the governing party, although we should note thatThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms in the period of the Conservative government the coefficients,
while large in magnitude, are not statistically significant.
Macro-economic evaluation and pocketbook voting
Unfortunately, our survey data do not include the standard
item used to measure “sociotropic” economic voting, which
has been shown in the literature to be more important than
pocketbook considerations (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007).
As a consequence, we are not able to compare the strength
of sociotropic and pocketbook considerations. However, we
can show that pocketbook considerations matter when con-
trolling for some types of national economic perceptions. The
1992, 1994, and 1996 surveys include two items that asked
whether respondents were concerned about rates of inflation
and unemployment in Britain. We added these two items
alongside people’s retrospective financial evaluations. As ex-
pected, those concerned with unemployment and inflation
tend to punish the government and defect from the Con-
servatives. These effects have a similar magnitude to the effect
of changing welfare transfers. Most importantly for this arti-
cle, the effects of pocketbook voting remain statistically sig-
nificant and in the same direction even when including these
sociotropic economic indicators. Comparing the fit of the dif-Table 5. Fixed Effects Logit Regression Model Predicting Government Party Support versus Opposition or No Party SupportConservative Government
Support (1991–96)116.071 on November 22, 2019 06:04:23 A
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicaLabour Government
Support (1997–2008)Coef. SE Coef.M
go.edu/t-and-c).SEFinancial change (Ref: Got better):
Worse off 2.24* .06 2.17* .03
Same 2.13* .06 2.12* .03Control variables (age, income, sector, class, employment):
No. of cases 2,358 6,920
No. of average obs. 5.3 8.5Financial change reasons (Ref: Same/no change):
Increased earnings .12 .09 .10* .03
Increased benefits .32 .24 .28* .08
Reduced expenses 2.08 .15 .06 .06
Other increase .07 .13 .11* .05
Decreased earnings 2.27* .11 .03 .05
Decreased benefits 2.53 .37 2.08 .12
More expenses 2.27* .10 2.08* .04
Other decrease 2.52* .13 2.04 .06Control variables (age, income, sector, class, employment):
No. of cases 1,897 6,819
No. of average obs. 4.5 8.4Source: BHPS 1991–2008.
Note. The dependent variable here measures support for the incumbent party versus any other party or no party.
* p ! .05.
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changes significantly improves the model even if we take into
account national economic evaluations. These results are re-
ported in appendix 5.Conditional effects of political interest
Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006; although see Godbout and
Belanger [2007] and Gomez and Wilson’s [2007] reply) ac-
knowledge the problem of diffuse attribution of responsi-
bility in traditional tests of pocketbook voting and focus on
how political sophistication is a key moderating factor in how
citizens relate changes to their welfare to vote choices. In their
theory of heterogeneous attribution, Gomez and Wilson argue
that politically unsophisticated individuals will tend to focus
on single, obvious causes for events or conditions, for exam-
ple, the president or indeed themselves. As reported in ap-
pendix 6, we find only weak support for this idea. Although
politically uninterested people (our best measure of political
sophistication is political interest) have slightly weaker pat-
terns of economic voting than the politically interested on av-
erage, we find no consistent pattern to egocentric economic
voting by political interest, at least in Britain over the time
period covered by the BHPS.Operationalization of party support
We also tested whether an alternative measure of party
support makes a difference to our results. In the main tables,
party support is measured using three questions. The first asks
whether respondents think of themselves as a “supporter of
any one political party,.” If they say no, then they are asked
whether they think of themselves as “a little closer to one
political party than to the other.” And if they say no to that,
they are finally asked “if there were to be a General Election
tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be
most likely to support.” In our alternative operationalization,
we just use the first two questions and count people who were
unwilling to say that they “supported” or “were closer” to a
party as supporters of no party. This measure should mean
that party supporters have a stronger bond to their preferred
party. Using this more conservative measure does not alter
our results; pocketbook voting appears to be just as strong.
These results are in appendix 7.Using vote choice instead of party support
as the dependent variable
Many studies of economic voting use vote choice as their de-
pendent variable. As discussed, this is not possible for data that
track people’s preferences from year to year. We were able to
rerun our models using vote choice for the Labour governingThis content downloaded from 130.209.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms period, which covers three general elections: 1997, 2001, and
2005. Appendix 8 reports the results of this analysis. The re-
sults largely confirm our main results in that people who were
better off are less likely to vote for the Conservatives and those
that were worse off tend to stop voting for Labour and instead
become Conservative voters. Equally, people who saw their
benefits increase are more likely to vote Labour over those three
elections.CONCLUSION
The empirical puzzle addressed in this article is that while
there is a widespread belief that governments can increase
their electoral support through targeted public spending, there
is far less evidence to show that party support is shaped by
personal financial circumstances. Although there are numer-
ous studies that show that citizens take into account changes
in the national economy more broadly, the evidence that eco-
nomic voting is rooted in personal experience is far more mixed.
Nonetheless, recent work examining specific government pol-
icies suggests that voters who are materially affected by such
policies do change their party support accordingly (Elinder et al.
2015; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; Richter 2006; Shady
2000). Building on such findings, this article has presented a
more general reassessment of the classic pocketbook voting
thesis, using panel survey data that captures how perceptions
of changing personal finances feed into changes in party sup-
port. In contrast to much of the existing work using survey
data to examine economic voting, we find that people are
more likely to switch party preference when they think that
their own personal finances have changed.
This is important as it sheds light on what drives chang-
ing patterns of party support and also lends credence to the
assumptions underlying much of the work on strategic pol-
iticians (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987;
Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). It suggests that
voters act in a self-interested manner and respond to changes
in their personal finances by sanctioning governments. How-
ever, the overall impact of pocketbook voting on election
outcomes should not be exaggerated. The effects are not huge.
Moreover, during stable economic times, it is relatively rare
that there are substantially more people thinking they are
worse off than better off or vice versa. The biggest differences
in our data set are found in 2001 and 2008. In 2001, at the
height of the economic boom, 31% of people said that they
had improving personal finances compared to 20% with de-
teriorating finances. In 2008, as the boom turned to bust, these
percentages were reversed with 36% of people thinking things
had gotten worse for them and 20% saying things had gotten
better. Perceptions of people’s own financial situation do track116.071 on November 22, 2019 06:04:23 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 567the wider economy but not that closely. This means that while
people in a worse financial position are less likely to stay loyal
to the government party and more likely to move to the
opposition party, much of that depressive effect on the gov-
ernment vote will be canceled out by people in a better fi-
nancial position staying loyal, or moving, to the government.
This means that although personal finances may help to ex-
plain how individuals change their party preferences, they are
inevitably less good at explaining aggregate changes in party
support.
Importantly, our article also goes beyond the classic pocket-
book model to explore when and why voters sanction gov-
ernments for changes to their personal finances. As our sec-
ond hypothesis surmised, personal finances appear to have a
greater impact when they can be more easily linked to the
actions of the state. Just as perceptions of the wider economy
matter more when it is clear that the government was re-
sponsible for changes to the general economic situation, changes
to an individual’s economic situation matter more when they
appear more closely linked to government action. This means
that much of the change that we see in party preferences can-
not be accounted for by higher growth rates leading to higher
wages, or deflation leading to reduced expenses. Rather, we
find the most important driver of personal economic per-
formance voting is actually change that can be attributed
directly to government policies, such as welfare payments and
other government transfers. These findings are thus aligned
with the recent literature on how voters respond to specific
government policies that affect their material self-interest, such
as flood relief (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011), targeted gov-
ernment transfers to poor families (Pop-Eleches and Pop-
Eleches 2012), or childcare payments (Elinder et al. 2015).
This therefore helps to explain when personal financial
self-interest matters. Voters do not appear to ask themselves
the simple question of whether they are better off than they
were last year when forming their party preferences. Instead,
they may switch party allegiance if they think that any changes
to their financial circumstances are directly due to the gov-
ernment. These findings help explain why previous studies
have found mixed evidence of pocketbook voting. They also
have broader normative implications for our understanding
of how voters hold politicians to account. It is well estab-
lished that voters sanction governments on the basis of their
perceptions of general economic performance, but our findings
suggest that targeted government spending that benefits specific
individuals may also sway affected voters, and conversely that
voters will punish governments for policy reforms that ad-
versely affect them. This suggests that there is pocketbook
voting but mainly when the name on the check is the gov-
ernment of the day.This content downloaded from 130.209.
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